Understanding the Buddha: Methods and Results

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It is a great honour and pleasure for me to have been invited to speak at this important conference in Korea. My wife and I have visited your beautiful country once before, eleven years ago. On that occasion Misan Sunim, as he is now known, acted as our guide and interpreter throughout our visit. We have never forgotten his kindness, and I still admire the way that he translated my lectures: he had no prepared script, but translated each sentence on the spot as I delivered it. I could tell from the subsequent questions and discussions that he had wonderfully succeeded in conveying my meaning.

Learning about Buddhism is an intellectual process, but it can and should be much more as well. Though my two visits to Korea have been brief, I have had the good fortune to visit several famous monasteries and to meet a fair number of Buddhist monks and nuns. This experience has given me the insight that the many minor differences between the Buddhist traditions of, say, Korea and Sri Lanka, while they are indeed interesting objects of study, must not conceal from us the core features of Buddhism which lie at the heart of all regional traditions: understanding and compassion. Soon after Misan Sunim came to study with me at Oxford, his presence inspired

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me to organise at Balliol College an open day for schoolchildren who were studying Buddhism. On that occasion six research students of mine who were or had been members of various branches of the Sangha gave short talks about why they had entered the Sangha and what it had meant to them. All the talks were fascinating, but what struck me most was that no one could have told, from the contents of the talks alone, which speakers were from the Mahayana and which from the Theravada traditions.

If the traditions are essentially so similar, despite their very wide geographical diffusion, it becomes all the more plausible that these similarities must go back to the period before Buddhism divided, indeed to the Buddha himself. It also makes one wonder whether some of the accusations that the traditions have flung at each other, and have been repeated by some modern scholars, can be correct. Let me take what is probably the most important example: the Mahayana, which we know to have begun several centuries after the Buddha’s death, sees the goal of enlightenment as perfect understanding and perfect compassion, inextricably intertwined. Can it be that this ideal was invented by the Mahayana and had been completely unknown to earlier Buddhism?

In the last fifteen years a small group of us in Oxford, myself and my research students, plus a couple of colleagues elsewhere, have been taking a new look at the earliest sources which give us information about the Buddha and what he preached. I make no apology for stating boldly that these are Pali sources; in fact they constitute a major part of the Pali Canon. Many of you will know that the texts to which I am mainly referring survive in two versions: in Pali, and in Chinese translations from Indian languages most of which date from early in the fifth century A.D. I make no claim a priori for the antiquity of the Pali version: the proof of the pudding is in the eating. Our recent research has shown that the Pali texts contain important allusions to Sanskrit texts current at the time of the Buddha, notably to the early Upanishads. However, most of the words and expressions contained in these allusions are absent from the Chinese translations. Moreover, while the texts of some of the Buddha’s sermons in both Pali and Chinese versions show signs of having been reworked in the light of the latest systematisation of Buddhist doctrine called the Abhidharma, it is the Chinese versions which have been more seriously affected by this kind of standardisation. I am not decrying the value of the Chinese sources as evidence, but translation out of an Indian language is not just a linguistic matter; any body of text is bound to become more difficult to understand when it is transported to a foreign culture.

There is really nothing very surprising about the claim that we shall understand the Buddha better if we know what he was responding to. As I have continually stressed in my publications\(^1\), communication cannot be effective unless it adopts the language of those to whom the communication is addressed. Though the Buddha preached a universal message, from which all can benefit, his thought was at the same time subtle and sophisticated, and it is not surprising if as -- indeed the texts claim -- he tended to address himself to the most

educated people in his society, especially brahmans, sometimes aristocracy or rich merchants. Moreover, one of the things for which the Buddha has always been most famous is his skill in means, which refers to his skill as a communicator. He adapted his message to his audience, but often did so by pretending to agree to what someone told him and then twisting its meaning. The great pioneer of Pali studies, T.W. Rhys Davids, put it like this:

When speaking on sacrifice to a sacrificial priest, on union with God to an adherent of the current theology, on Brahman claims to superior social rank to a proud Brahman, on mystic insight to a man who trusts in it, on the soul to one who believes in the soul theory, the method followed is always the same. Gotama puts himself as far as possible in the mental position of the questioner. He attacks no ne of his cherished convictions. He accepts as the starting-point of his own exposition the desirability of the act or condition prized by his opponent -- of the union with God (as in the Tevijja), or of sacrifice (as in the Kujadanta), or of social rank (as in the Ambath a), or of seeing heavenly sights, etc. (as in the Mahall), or of the soul theory (as in the Potthapida). He even adopts the very phraseology of his questioner. And then, partly by putting a new and (from the Buddhist point of view) a higher meaning into the words; partly by an appeal to such ethical conceptions as are common ground between them; he gradually leads his opponent up to his conclusion. This is, of course, always Arahatship-----

The most fundamental example of how the Buddha stood a technical term on its head is the word *karma*. *Karma* is a Sanskrit noun derived from the verb meaning “to do, to act”. It thus means act, action, deed. In all Indian religious traditions it refers to *significant* action: if I happen to scratch my nose while I am lecturing that is an action, but it does not count as *karma*. In brahminism, the typical significant act was a ritual act, and a positive act was normally seen as purifying, for which the Sanskrit word is puṣya. The Buddha said, It is intention that I call karma. Logically this is almost as outrageous as saying, “When I say black I mean white.” For intention is the opposite of action. Action, being external and visible, can be classified in an infinite number of ways. The Buddha was interested in classifying intention only into good and bad, virtuous and wicked. For good intention he used the term *puṣya karma*, making a metaphor of brahminical purification. For the Buddha, every virtuous intention, which means every benign and intelligent intention, brings one closer to that ultimate purity which stands as a metaphor for enlightenment.

I would like to claim that the recent work we have been doing at Oxford on early Buddhism has made major advances in our understanding of the Buddha’s message. Some of these advances have come through a better appreciation of what metaphors the Buddha was using, and these in turn we have understood through comparing the Buddha’s usage with the usages of brahmans and Jains. Thus for example Dr. Hwang

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3) In English we use the nominative, "karma". The Pali form is *kamma*. When we refer to the word in Sanskrit or Pali it makes no difference whether we use or omit the final *a*, and the same goes for the word *brahman* which features below.

4) Pali: puṣya karma.
Soon-II has thoroughly explored the metaphorical structure of which the word nirvāṇa forms a part. Nirvāṇa means the going out of a fire or flame, so that to understand how the term is used one needs to understand what it is that is being referred to, metaphorically, as a fire. The Pali Canon quite plainly gives us the answer to this question: the Buddha refers to passion, hatred and stupidity as three fires, directly comparing them to the three ritual fires which it was the duty of an orthodox brahmin to maintain by feeding them with fuel. In a further extension of the metaphor he uses the word for fuel, upādāna\(^5\) or upādi, in its metaphorical meaning of craving, so that the five processes which constitute the living individual, the subject of experience, are referred to as five masses of burning fuel, upādana-kkhandha. Since Dr. Hwang has expounded all this in his forthcoming book, I shall say no more about it today, but merely urge you to read the book.

It seems to me that when one claims to have made an important discovery about the meaning of a text which many other people have studied, one’s claim will appear much more plausible if one can also suggest why the discovery has not been made before. I think that I can do this for our recent discoveries. Modern scholars have not made them because so very few people in the world study Pali, and among those who do, few also study Sanskrit. In most countries where classical Indian languages and culture are studied at all, Sanskrit studies and Buddhist studies tend to be carried on in isolation from each other, so that few people read, for example, both the Upaniṣads and the Pali Canon. Buddhism and brahminism were in dialogue in ancient India for more than a thousand years, and yet appallingly little has been done to study how they were related and influenced each other, whether positively or negatively. This is one of the benefits which I believe could flow from founding a Centre of Buddhist Studies at Oxford, where at least the tiny band of Indologists whom we train are taught to look at Indian religious texts in their historical context and be alert to the interactions between traditions.

This deficiency of modern scholarship mirrors the way that the Buddhist tradition itself has tended to work. In the countries where the Theravāda tradition has taken root, notably Sri Lanka, Burma and Thailand, many monks have become learned in Pali language and literature, but very few have at the same time studied non-Buddhist texts composed in Sanskrit. Naturally the words of the Buddha are regarded as timeless, so that the historical circumstances in which they were uttered can be of little interest. This tradition as we can observe it in modern times is itself but a continuation of the ancient tradition which produced the Pali commentaries.

When we look at a Pali canonical text, we do well to use a commentary to guide us in our initial attempt at interpretation. These commentaries are themselves in the Pali language. Those on the Buddha’s sermons are all ascribed to one man, Buddhaghosa, whom we know to have been active in Sri Lanka at the very beginning of the fifth century A.D. Buddhaghosa also wrote a huge book, called The Path to Purity (Visuddhi-magga), which summarises Theravāda Buddhist doctrine in so masterly a fashion that it has remained authoritative to this day. Sometimes the other commentaries refer to The Path to Purity for amplification on a topic. (Even

\(^5\) From here on I shall use Pali for Buddhist terms, Sanskrit only for words from Sanskrit sources.
so, I do not myself think that they are all the work of Buddhaghosa, but that need not concern us today.) To what extent Buddhaghosa (with possible colleagues) is the author and to what extent he is the editor of the commentaries may never be fully known, but it is beyond dispute that he often explicitly cites older commentaries, mostly written in Sinhala. These have all been lost, but obviously they take us back far beyond Buddhaghosa: one scholar who studied them, E. W. Adikaram,\(^6\) thinks that they were closed in the second century A.D. What the evidence seems to show beyond doubt is that they were not closed earlier than that. According to tradition (embedded in those same commentaries), their substance goes back to the communal rehearsal of the doctrine held just after the Buddha’s death, and was brought to Sri Lanka in the middle of the third century B.C. by the group led by Mahinda, the missionaries who introduced Buddhism into the island. Tradition also holds that the texts, including the commentaries, were first written down in Sri Lanka in the first century B.C. The commentaries were probably recorded in Sinhala.

In sum, the Theravadin tradition of exegesis claims that it stretches right back from the texts we now have to the time of the Buddha himself, a period of about eight hundred years, and I see no reason to consider this claim implausible. But this is entirely different from positing that over those eight centuries, while the commentaries were transmitted orally (and there is no reason to think that during oral transmission they had the fixity imparted by writing), were translated and edited, nothing of importance was added, lost or otherwise changed. For that there would surely be no parallel recorded in human history. Nor was there any cultural scruple to inhibit changing the commentaries, for they do not even have the sanctity of being ascribed to the Buddha himself.

The interpretation offered by the commentaries is thus of great antiquity and has to be taken extremely seriously. But this does not preclude us from using our critical faculties. I hold that the commentaries suffer from three major defects. Perhaps the most important is that they have largely lost the memory of the Buddha’s historical context. As I have already said, one can show that important aspects of the Buddha’s message are formulated in terms set by the early brahminical scriptures, especially the *Brhadaranyaka Upanisad*, both where he agrees and where he disagrees with the brahmins, and that we lose a whole dimension of his meaning if we are unaware of this context and argument.

The second defect in the commentaries is excessive literalism, a failing that the Buddha himself foresaw and warned against. Once the texts had been formulated, their words were carefully preserved and a technical significance was often ascribed to some quite normal and innocent expression. It is to uncover such cases that research such as that of Dr. Hwang is required. Nor is this only a matter of spotting and explicating metaphors. If the Buddha took over the terms and even the arguments of the people he was talking to, and twisted them to give them quite a different meaning, we are dealing also with irony: in reading his words, we have to catch his tone of voice.

I need to pause and dwell on this for a moment. In so far as modern scholars and interpreters of the Buddha have considered

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his relationship to brahminism at all, they have generally taken a very simplistic line. One view, more or less following the Pali tradition, has been that the Buddha simply opposed the brahmins. If on the other hand one draws attention to similarities between the Buddha and the Vedic tradition, one is immediately taken to be saying that doctrinally the Buddha was a Vedāntin, whose only important disagreement with the brahmins was about caste. (This line of interpretation is quite popular today in India.) But surely the truth is much more subtle and more interesting. The Buddha rarely said just “Yes” or “No”; he said “Yes, but”. The but could be quietly devastating.

The third deficiency I see in the commentaries is less relevant to my topic today, but nevertheless important enough to require mention. It is homogenisation. As has happened in every learned religious tradition, the exegetes homogenised and systematised the founder’s message. The brahminical exegetical tradition made explicit the principle that revealed texts, śruti, had only one purport; this was called eka-vākyata. No such principle was explicitly formulated in Buddhism, but one cannot too often stress that in ancient India the brahmin culture was hegemonic and deeply influenced all other traditions.

Awareness of these deficiencies has helped us to attain important new insights into the Buddha’s meaning, far too many to mention today. Since the very core of the Buddha’s message, as understood by all traditions, concerns the twin values of compassion and understanding (a word I prefer to wisdom because it sounds more accessible, less mystical), let me briefly present to you discoveries concerning these two matters.

First, then, our claim to have discovered that the Buddha preached that the practice of kindness and compassion was a means to the attainment of nirvana.

The Theravada tradition has always laid enormous emphasis on kindness (Pali: metta), and one of the Pali texts most widely known and used is a poem from the Pali Canon called the Metta Sutta. In Sri Lanka today all Buddhist schoolchildren recite this poem every day before they go home from school and are supposed to think about what it means. Most of the poem prescribes how one should love all living beings as a mother loves her own child. It concludes: “Towards the whole world one should develop loving thoughts, boundless: upwards, downwards, sideways, without restriction, enmity or rivalry. Standing, walking, sitting or lying, one should be as alert as possible and keep one’s mind on this. They call this divine living in this world. Not taking up ideas, virtuous, with perfect insight, by controlling greed for sensual pleasure one does not return to lie in a womb”. This states that kindness is a means to attaining nirvana. Nor is this claim confined to this text. In the famous collection of Pali stanzas ascribed to the Buddha, the Dhammapadā, number 368 says: “The monk who dwells in kindness, with faith in the Buddha’s teaching, may attain the peaceful state, the blissful cessation of conditioning.”

As philologists of Sanskrit or Pali will know, one need not attach much weight to the fact that the verse says “may attain” (in the optative) rather than “will attain” in the indicative. Moreover, in another version of this verse preserved in Sanskrit the verb is in fact in the indicative (adhigacchati). The verse is in fact saying that kindness is salvific, and it is
surely no coincidence that the term for nirvana, “the peaceful state”, is the same as that used at the opening of the *Metta Sutta*.

Since all this is so, why is the fact that the Buddha preached that kindness is a path to salvation, to nirvana, not known to everyone? Why is this not clear in the later Theravada tradition, so that the Mahayana had to re-emphasise it?

The answer lies in the too literal and historically uninformed interpretation of a famous text called the *Tevijja Sutta*, sutta 13 of the *Digha Nikāya*. There is a set of four states of mind which the Buddha highly commends: kindness, compassion, empathetic joy and equanimity. How the four relate to each other we can learn from Buddhaghosa: one becomes “like a mother with four sons, namely a child, an invalid, one in the flush of youth, and one busy with his own affairs; for she wants the child to grow up, wants the invalid to get well, wants the one in the flush of youth to enjoy for long the benefits of youth, and is not at all bothered about the one who is busy with his own affairs.” These four states have two names: they are called “the unlimited” or “boundless” (appamāda) and they are also called the brahma-vihāra. A vihāra came to be the word for a Buddhist monastery — hence the name of the Indian state of Bihar. It means “monastery” because it means “a place to stay”. The noun derives from a verb which simply means “to spend time, to stay”, and the noun can just mean “staying”. What about brahma? Brahman is a name for the religious goal of the brahmans, the monistic principle posited in the Upaniṣads, texts which convey brahma-vidyā, knowledge of brahman. (Another name for this ideology is vedānta.) As the monistic principle, brahman is neuter, but there is also a masculine Brahma, a supreme god, whom we might regard as a personification of the neuter principle, though historically the development may have been the reverse. I shall spell him with a capital letter. The Buddhist term brahma-vihāra thus carries an inescapable reference to brahminism, for it means “staying with brahman”. Whether one regards that brahman as personal or impersonal, masculine or neuter since — the form of the word allows either interpretation — for a brahmin “staying” with brahma is the ultimate goal, the state of salvation.

The four brahma-vihāra occur in several canonical texts, but the locus classicus is the *Tevijja Sutta*. Indeed, some of the vocabulary and phraseology of the *Metta Sutta* comes straight out of the *Tevijja Sutta*. In that prose text, the Buddha introduces the four brahma-vihāra in a narrative context. Two young brahmans are arguing about the direct way to what they call “companionship with Brahma”, and decide to ask the Buddha. This leads to a long conversation, in which the Buddha makes fun of brahmans for claiming to teach the way to a goal they have never seen; he compares this, among other things, to declaring one is in love with a beauty queen without having the faintest idea what she looks like, who she is or where she lives. He contrasts the brahmans who claim to know all their sacred texts, the three Vedas, with the picture they draw of Brahma, whom they claim they will join because they resemble him, and says that on the other hand it is a Buddhist monk

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8) However, in the *Metta Sutta* the (syonymous) word is aparimāna, perhaps because of the exigency of the metre.
who resembles Brahma. His account of the monk’s way of life culminates in his saying that the monk permeates every direction with his kindness, compassion, empathetic joy and equanimity. Thus it appears plausible that at death such a monk “goes to companionship with Brahma”, he says. Convinced by this, the two young brahmins convert to Buddhism.

In all gnostic religions salvation is bound to be a two-stage process: to have the salvific realisation, one has to be alive, and then the ultimate solution comes when life ends. The ideal Upaniṣadic monist understands that he is brahman, and then becomes brahman at death; one can neatly express this by bringing out the range of meanings in the English verb “realise”, and saying that he “realises” his true nature by insight while alive, and makes it real at death. In Buddhism this same dual character of nirvana is expressed by saying that the blowing out of the fires of greed, hatred and delusion while one is still alive leaves a residue of fuel (sa-upādi-sesa nibbāna), while the death of such an enlightened person is nibbāna with no such residue (an-upādi-sesa): there is simply nothing left which could again be ignited with the passions.

The key to a proper understanding of the Tevijja Sutta lies in book 6 of the Brihadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad. That text teaches that there are two contrasting fates which await good people when they die; which way one takes depends on one’s kind of good-ness. If one has lived doing one’s duty, the acts prescribed by the Vedic tradition, one will reap the reward. However, just as each action is limited, the reward for it is correspondingly limited. So though good acts (puṇya karman) take one to the heaven of the ancestors, the results they have produced finally wear out and one returns, in the rain, to be reborn on earth and start all over again. By contrast, those who have achieved gnosis go beyond the sun to the lightning when they die; thence they are conducted to the worlds of brahman (brahma-lokaṇ) and stay there; they are never reborn. The compound noun in fact leaves open the possibility that the worlds they stay in are of Brahman, the masculine name, or even of Brahmans in the plural.

This Upaniṣadic doctrine of salvation can be understood on two levels, the less and the more sophisticated. On the less sophisticated level, it means that the person saved by gnosis goes to join Brahman, masculine, the supreme god. This is a literal interpretation of the text. The more sophisticated understanding is to take brahman as neuter, an abstract principle, which is located at the top of the universe only metaphorically.

In the Tevijja Sutta the young brahmins are taking the less sophisticated, more literal view of Brahman; that is why the talk is of “companionship with Brahman”. The Buddha says to the two young brahmins that a monk who has boundless kindness, compassion, empathetic joy and equanimity is, like Brahman, without grasping (apariggaṇa a word that can also mean “without possessions”) and in full control (vassavatti a word that when applied to a god comes close to meaning omnipotent, but for a monk refers to self-control), and so at death may well (ṭham etamp ujjati) go to join Brahman. He is showing them that the unlimited experience which will lead them to that companionship is not the gnosis prescribed in the Upaniṣad but the experience of unlimited kindness, compassion, empathetic joy and equanimity. Of all the four states, from
kindness to equanimity, the Buddha says that when they have been developed, the karma which is finite (pāramārtha-katāmr) no longer remains. No more finite results. That can only mean freedom from rebirth.

Gnosis is not the kind of thing that can have a limit, so its result in the Brahadāraṇyaka Upanisad has no limit either. For gnosis, the Buddha substitutes ethical states, such as kindness and compassion.

Unfortunately the Theravadin tradition has been no less literal-minded that were the two young brahmans who approached the Buddha. It has taken the text literally to mean that those who practise the boundless states will at death go to a world of Brahman. This has then been built into the whole cosmology, with massive results. Like the Upanisads and the rest of Vedic religion, the Buddhist tradition holds that above this world in which we live there is a heaven or set of heavens inhabited by gods and good ancestors. Above this is added — I think because of the Tevijja Sutta — what one might call a super-heaven, the Brahman world or worlds. The distinction in Buddhist cosmology between an ordinary heaven, a "god-world" (deva-loka) and a Brahman-world (brahma-loka) always remains sharp: all Buddhist traditions agree that the former is part of the sphere of desire (kāma-dhātu), the latter by contrast part of the sphere of form (rūpa-dhātu).

We can see that this literal interpretation represents a failure to understand the Buddha’s skill in means, his ironic re-interpretation of Vedantic soteriology. The clinching argument to show that I am correct in asserting this lies in the fact that when in the text the Buddha introduces the four unlimited states, he calls each of them "mental liberation" (ceto-vimutti).

Why did people either fail to notice this crucial detail or try to argue it away? When the Buddha’s teachings were systematised, nirvana had to be clearly defined, and the leading definition was that it was the same as the total elimination of passion (or greed), hatred and delusion. Those who adhered to this (quite unexceptionable) formulation were reluctant to accept that an account of nirvana which made no mention of eliminating passion, hatred and delusion could really be saying what it purported to say. Systematised Buddhist doctrine insists that the final step to liberation as taught by the Buddha consists of a gnosis with a specific content, an insight into the nature of the phenomenal world as being impermanent, dissatisfying and without essence. According to this view, there is a progression: morality, concentration, understanding; and each of these three factors is a pre-requisite for the next. The four boundless states are classified as forms of concentration, not of understanding, so they cannot be part of the culminating gnosis.

I very much doubt that it was the Buddha who classified the four boundless states as coming into the category of concentration as opposed to morality or understanding. Why should they not be considered to come into all three categories?

Yet again, literalism has missed the point.

It is the approach pioneered at Oxford that is producing these results; of course, anyone can apply the same method. The most startling discovery of all, in my opinion, has been made by a brilliant Vedist at the University of Warsaw, Dr. Joanna Jurewicz. I asked her in 1998 if the formulation of the *pratītya-samutpāda*, the Buddha’s chain of dependent origination, reminded her of anything in the Vedic texts. She very soon produced a paper\(^{10}\) in which she shows that this fundamental teaching represents the Buddha’s answer to Vedic cosmogony, and indeed to the fundamental ontology of brahminical thought.

Let me be clear about the nature of this thrilling discovery. The chain of dependent origination has to be understood on two levels, the general and the particular. At the general level, it embodies the Buddhist claim that nothing exists without a cause and that indeed there are no “things” existing in total isolation from other “things”; there are only causal processes. As Prof. Paul Williams once put it to me, for Buddhism there are no nouns, only verbs. Over the centuries Buddhists came to regard the Buddha’s teaching as “the middle way” in this sense: that he proclaimed neither the existence of things in their own right, which we would now call essentialism, nor some kind of nihilism, but that the world of our experience is a world of flux and process. This process is also a middle way in that it is neither random nor rigidly determined, for it leaves room for that free will without which the doctrine of karma makes no sense. This “middleness” gave its name to the school of philosophy founded by Nagarjuna, *Madhyamaka*.

On the other hand, the particular interpretation of the chain of dependent origination has been contested among Buddhists from the earliest days. There simply is no one agreed interpretation. Moreover, in the locus classicus for this doctrine, the *Mahā Nidāna Sutta*, the text begins (*Digha Nikāya* II, 55) with a unique feature. Ananda happily tells the Buddha that he has understood the chain of dependent origination, and the Buddha reprimands him, saying that it is extremely difficult to understand. The Buddha normally is shown in texts as doing his very best to make himself clear, and I know of no parallel to his statement here that this teaching of his is profound and difficult to understand. I interpret it to mean that those who first formulated the text and recorded the teaching did not understand it themselves.

It is not surprising that this obscure teaching appears in several variant forms. In the commonest form, however, the chain has twelve links, and it is this form that Dr. Jurewicz has explained. That there are other forms seems to me to be no argument against her interpretation. The part of the chain which has caused the most difficulty is the first four links: ignorance conditions volitional impulses, which condition consciousness, which condition name and form (which she shows to refer to individuation). Since she has given a convincing interpretation of why these terms are used, they must have been there in the original teaching.

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10) Jurewicz, J. "Playing with fire: the *pratītyasamutpāda* from the perspective of Vedic thought". *Journal of the Pali Text Society*, XXVI, 2000, pp.77-103. This paper was first read at the conference of the International Association of Buddhist Studies in Lausanne, 1999.
Since Dr. Jurewicz’s article has been published, I shall not here attempt to reproduce her very rich argument, but only to give its gist. The Buddha chose to express himself in these terms, she says, because he was responding to Vedic cosmogony as represented particularly in the famous “Hymn of Creation”, Rg Veda X, 129, and in the first chapter of the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad, but also in the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa and other Upaniṣads. In this cosmogony a close correspondence, amounting originally even to an identity, between the microcosm and the macrocosm is assumed. At first there is nothing, not even the distinction between existence and non-existence, for there is no consciousness which could be aware of existence. Then somehow -- it cannot be explained -- a volitional impulse initiates the process of creation or evolution. The first result is pure consciousness. Initially it is consciousness alone, not consciousness of anything. Then it cognises itself. From this reflexivity, in which there is still only one entity, develops an awareness of subject and object, and then this in turn leads to further individuation, until we reach the multiplicity of our experience: individuation both by name, i.e., linguistic category, and by appearance, perceptible to the senses.

The first four terms of the Buddha’s chain correspond to this process, and the rest of his chain carries it through further, still in line with Vedic ideas. However, the end of the chain -- decay, death, grief and lamentation -- is a climax which turns round and subverts all that has gone before. For Vedic thought, the Absolute which cognises itself and so generates the world is the Ātman, which is at the same time the self of every sentient being. Let me quote Jurewicz: “The Buddha preached at least some of his sermons to educated people, well versed in Brāhmaṇic thought, who were familiar with the concepts and the general idea of the Vedic cosmogony. To them, all the terms used in the pratiṣṭhāna-pratigya had a definite meaning and they evoked definite associations. Let us imagine the Buddha enumerating all the stages of the Vedic cosmogony only to conclude: ‘That’s right, this is how the whole process develops. However, the only problem is that no one undergoes a transformation here!’ From the didactic point of view, it was a brilliant strategy. The act of cutting off the atman...deprives the Vedic cosmogony of its positive meaning as the successful activity of the Absolute and presents it as a chain of absurd, meaningless changes which could only result in the repeated death of anyone who would reproduce this cosmogonic process in ritual activity and everyday life.”11

This interpretation of dependent origination does not subvert the Buddhist tradition or run counter to traditional Buddhist ideas. On the contrary, it enriches them, giving precise meaning to what was previously obscure by adding substance and detail to the Buddha’s “no soul” doctrine. Moreover, it is a powerful example of the Buddha’s famous “skill in means”, and his use of irony.

Let me conclude where I began. Over two and a half millennia Buddhism spread peacefully into many countries and shaped many cultures. The tradition became at the same time richer and more diffuse. The recent dramatic improvements in communications present Buddhists, like the rest of the world,

with an unprecedented situation, in which we can communicate almost instantly by fax, telephone and email, and it is practical for students from Korea to come to study at Oxford and for me to travel to meet you in Korea. But has the study of Buddhism yet taken full advantage of this situation? I think not. The Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studies envisages global cooperation, especially between traditionally Buddhist countries like Korea and countries where Buddhism is still little known, like Britain. It is committed to the study of all forms of Buddhism, and by any method that yields results. But I hope to have demonstrated in this lecture that much remains to be said about even the very core of Buddhism, compassion and understanding, and that if only the financial means are available we can establish an institution which, like Buddhism, will belong to the world and spread the compassion and understanding of which the world is so much in need.

Abstract

Understanding the Buddha —Method and Results

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Our recent research has shown that the Pali texts contain important allusions to Sanskrit texts current at the time of the Buddha, notably to the early Upanishads. There is really nothing very surprising about the claim that we shall understand the Buddha better if we know what he was responding to. The most fundamental example of how the Buddha stood a technical term on its head is the word karman. The Buddha said, “It is intention that I call karma.” The Buddha was interested in classifying intention only into good and bad, virtuous and wicked. I would like to claim that the recent work we have been doing at Oxford on early Buddhism has made major advances in our understanding of the Buddha’s message.

Some of these advances have come through a better appreciation of what metaphors the Buddha was using, and these in turn we have understood through comparing the Buddha’s usage with the usages of brahmans and Jains.

In the countries where the Theravada tradition has taken root, notably Sri Lanka, Burma and Thailand, many monks
have become learned in Pali language and literature, but very few have at the same time studied non-Buddhist texts composed in Sanskrit. This tradition as we can observe it in modern times is itself but a continuation of the ancient tradition which produced the Pali commentaries.

The Theravada tradition has always laid enormous emphasis on kindness (Pali: metta), and one of the Pali texts most widely known and used is a poem from the Pali Canon called the Metta Sutta. In the famous collection of Pali stanzas ascribed to the Buddha, the Dhammapada, number 368 says: "The monk who dwells in kindness, with faith in the Buddha’s teaching, may attain the peaceful state, the blissful cessation of conditioning."

There is a set of four states of mind which the Buddha highly commends: kindness, compassion, empathetic joy and equanimity. Brahman is a name for the religious goal of the brahmans, the monistic principle posited in the Upaniṣads, texts which convey brahma-vidyā, "knowledge of brahman". The Buddhist term brahma-vihāra thus carries an inescapable reference to brahminism, for it means "staying with brahman". In that prose text, the Buddha introduces the four brahma-vihāra in a narrative context. Two young brahmans are arguing about the direct way to what they call "companionship with Brahman", and decide to ask the Buddha. Convinced by this, the two young brahmans convert to Buddhism. The Buddha says to the two young brahmans that a monk who has boundless kindness, compassion, empathetic joy or equanimity is, like Brahman, without grasping and in full control, and so at death may well go to join Brahman. For gnosis, the Buddha substitutes ethical states, such as kindness and compassion.

Unfortunately the Theravadin tradition has been no less literal-minded that were the two young brahmans who approached the Buddha. It has taken the text literally to mean that those who practise the boundless states will at death go to a world of Brahman. Systematised Buddhist doctrine insists that the final step to liberation as taught by the Buddha consists of a gnosis with a specific content, an insight into the nature of the phenomenal world as being impermanent, dissatisfying and without essence. The Buddha seems to have preached that the practice of kindness and compassion was a means to the attainment of nirvana.

Keyword: Upanishad(우파니사드), Theravada(더라바다), kindness(metta), brahma-vihāra, soteriology(구원학), skill in means(대기법)
번역

못다를 이해하는 법: 방법과 결과

리처드 골브리치

한국에서의 이렇게 중요한 학회에 초청된 것은 대한영어 기밥
게 생각합니다. 저의 저자와 저는 11년 전에 이 아름답고 나날을 한반
문했었습니다. 그 당시 미산 스님께서 우리사이에 아이드미스를 통합으로 임진을
함께 하셨습니다. 우리는 스님의 친절함을 아직 잊지 않고 있으며 당시
저의 강의를 훈련하게 통학하게 주셨습니다. 미리 준비된 원고도 없이
현장에서 저의 강의를 직접 단락 별로 통학하게 주셨습니다. 강의 후 있었던
문자문과 대담은 스님이 저의 이야기를 훈련하게 진행하셨던 것을
알 수 있었습니다.

불교를 연구하는 것은 단순한 지적인 과정 이상의 어떤 것이아닐
할 것 같습니다. 비록 좋은 일정이었지만 두 번의 한국 방문을 통해서 여
리 유명한 사찰들을 방문하고 많은 비구 스님들과 비구니 스님들을 만날
수 있었습니다. 이러한 경험을 통해서 여러 불교 종류들 사이의 작은 차
이점들이 지혜하기도 지망한 모든 청중들의 중심에 있는 해설적인 특성을
가려서는 안 될 것을 드러주는 것을 주었습니다. 미산 스님이 옥스퍼드로 온
직후, 벨리온 클리퍼서 불교를 공부했던 어린 학생들을 위한 모임을
가게 되었습니다. 이때 여러 중과에 속한 저와 어릴 적 제자들이 어떻게 해
서 즐기기를 하게 되었습니다. 그리고 즐기는 이들이에게 어떤 의며를 가지고
있었는지를 이야기했습니다. 이들이가 다 흥미로웠지만 가장 흥미로
있던 것은 이들이 이야기를 놓고 보았을 때 누가 대불교의 승려이고 누가
대불교의 승려인지 그 누구도 이야기 할 수 없었다는 것입니다.

특히 놀라운 것은 놀라운 보급도 불교 종류들에 기반적으로 유사하
고 한다면, 이러한 유사점들은 불교가 분열되기 이전까지 아마도 못다가
지 거슬러 올라갈 가능성이 있습니다. 이점은 아마도 과거부터 여러 종

1) 대표적으로 다음의 논문이 있습니다. Understanding early Buddhist
termology in its context, 벨리온 클리퍼서 옥스퍼드 논문 II, pp.74-101,
성체하고 복잡해서 자기 스스로를 그 사회에서 가장 교육받은 계층, 특히 브라만, 크사트리야, 또는 무한한 색인으로 정하는 경향이 있었으나, 더욱이 봉타는 천달로서의 자신의 기량을 잘 보여주는 대기설법으로 아주 유명합니다. 그는 자신의 청其它问题에 따라 자신의 이익을 바라보는 경우에 종종 자신에게 이익을 받으려는 상태에 동의하는 적 하면서 그 의 미를 바라보입니다. 발리 연구의 선구자 중의 한 사람인 리즈 데이비스는 이것을 다음과 같이 말합니다.

제사에 대해 사제와 이야기할 때, 신과의 함께에 대해 당시의 신학을 신봉하는 사람과 이익할 때, 사회적인 브라만의 우월성에 대해 교묘한 브라만이 이야기할 때, 신비적 적관에 대해 이것을 믿는 사람과 이야기할 때 그리고 어린이에 대해 아동은 이론을 믿는 사람과 이야기할 때, 포도의 방법론은 거의 동일하다. 고대의 자기 스스로를 질문자의 정신적 입장에 최대한 가깝게 접근시킨다. 상대방이 소중히 생각하는 신념들을 전혀 공격하지 않는다. 그는 상대가 정강하는 행위나 조건을 충돌시키는 쪽으로 설명을 시작한다. 예를 들어 데비에서 신과의 합일을, 루다니트에는 제자리를, 아바르니시는 사회적 지위, 아티에는 천상의 눈을 가지고 있는, 포커비아에서는 아티만 이론을 중단점으로 삼고 있다고 한다. 그는 질문자의 말투가 되지 않도록 한다. 그리고 나서 부분적으로 실용과 불명료한 방법을 보았을 때 루어난 이론에 응용하여, 부분적으로 타자에게 공동된 도덕적 권에서 보호시켜 봉타는 정착적으로 상대방을 자신의 결정으로 이킨다. 물론 이것은 항상 그림듯이 어려워지는 것으로……

봉타가 이런 식으로 전문용어를 다루는 가장 중요한 예는 행위이다. 행위(karma)는 '행하다', '작용하다'는 동사에서 파생된 빌어 명사로서 '행위, 작업, 행동'을 의미한다. 인도종교 전통에서 이 용어는 아주 중요한 행위를 의미한다. 저가 강의 중 저의 고를 끊고 한다면


3) 영어에서는 주관적으로 *karma*를 사용합니다. 발리어 형태는 *kamma*입니다. 마지막으로 봉타가 말하거나 말거나 상황이* brahman*의 경우에 있어서도 동일합니다.

이것은 행위(karma)가 아닙니다. 브라만 전통에서는 제시행위가 일반적, 인중한 행위로 받아들여지는데 선한 행위는 벌이 puyada 지시되도록 정화되는 것을 주로 의미합니다. 봉타는 '의도로 행위로 여기겠다'고 말합니다. 논리적으로 이 말은 '내가 결단이라 말할 때 원칙을 의미한다'고 볼하는 것만큼 과학적으로, 의도는 행위에 반대되는 것이기 때문입니다. 의도적이고 사각적인 행위는 무수히 많은 종류로 분류될 수 있습니다.

봉타의 의도는 단지 선과 악 도덕과 부도덕으로 분류되는 것뿐만 관심이 있습니다. 선한 행위는 그는 브라만 정기에도 그러한 의도를 사용해서 puy a karma라고 합니다. 봉타에 있어서 자비롭고 자적인 모든 의도를 의 미하는 도덕적인 행위는 개발에 대한 일종의 비밀로 근본적인 정화를 끼리 운동한다. 마지막으로 이에 대한 도덕성의 최근 연구는 봉타의 의도를 이해하는 것에 있어서 중요한 발전을 이끌어 냈다고 자명하고 설명한다. 몇몇 이러한 발전들은 봉타가 어떤 비밀을 사용하는가를 브라만이나 자이나에 있어서 사용한 용어와 봉타의 용어를 비교함을 통해 자각하게 이해되었음에 더욱 잘 드러나게 되는 것 같습니다. 예를 들어 황제인 박사는 아들이라 음용을 사용한 비밀적인 체계를 자각하게 연구했습니다. 일반은 분명히 씨유를 의미하는데 이 용어가 어떻게 사용되었는지를 알기 위해 분명히 비밀적으로 지정되는 것은 의외 어떤 것인가를 알아야 합니다. 발리 경전은 아주 손쉽게 이 질문의 해당자에게 주는데, 봉타에 있어서는 용어, 중요 운동의 세 가지 불을 가리키는 것으로 전통적인 브라만들이 의문정도 력을 공급하면서 계속 유지시키는 세 가지의 제식적인 불에 직접 비밀로 갖고 이 비밀이 더욱 확장된 것으로 *updanam* 또는 *upada*에 용어에 대해서 깊이에 대한 비밀적인 의미로 서의 행위를 적어 경이로의 주제로 인간관계를 구성하는 다섯 가지 의미를 다섯 가지 불리는 필프로 설명된다는 것을 이해하고 있습니다. 각자가 이에 대한 내용들을 곤 출판된 책에서 발휘 것이다. 이에 때문에 오늘은 여기에 대해 더 이상 이야기하지 않겠지만 여러분들이 한편 임의로 보실 것을 권장합니다.

여러 사람들이 인지하는 지도의 의미에 대해 누군가가 어떤 중요한 발견을 했다고 주장할 때, 어떤 이유로 이것이 이전에는 발견되지 않았
이들이 찾아고자 이전으로 거슬러 올라가는 것은 자명합니다. 이들은 연구한 아디카라 영화와 야마토 기원 후 2세기 경으로 추정되고 있습니다. 현재의 자료들에 의하면 그 이전까지는 거슬러 올라갈 수 없는 것 같습니다. 빌리 전승에 의하면 그들의 기초는 봉나가 앞부분에 자라 있던 장기적으로 따라 올라가며 기원 전 3세기 슈리랑카로 옮겨와 함께 올라가온 불교들이 전 세계 역사에 전파하고 있던 불교사들에 의해 전해진 것으 로 이어갑니다. 주석자들은 이러한 문헌들을 기원 전 1세기 전에 슈리랑 카에서 최초로 전자화하였다고 하며 아마도 주석사들은 성찰례로 기록되었을 것 입니다.

중점 하면, 봉나바다 주석 전통은 봉나바다의 시대부터 봉나바다의 시 대까지 800여년으로 확장하는데 이 주석을 못 믿을 이유는 그렇게 많지 않다고 볼 수 있습니다. 하지만, 800여년 동안 주석사들이 규격으로 전승되고 변형되며 편집되며 여러 중요한것도 참가되거나 사라지거나 변화되기도 하였다고 보는 것은 전혀 다름 아리가집니다. 이전에 대해 아마도 인류의 역사에 그러한 이어가기 전에 기록되지 않았다는 것을 인용하고 싶습니다. 주석사에 변형을 기하자에 아리한 문학적 수준을 기록하지 않았으며 봉나 자신의 것으로 돌리는 것에 대해서도 아리한 수준이 많았습니다.

따라서 주석서에서 주어진 해석들은 오래된 것으로 아주 신경하게 취 금해야한다 합니다. 물론 이전에 우리들의 맹석적인 설명을 얻는 것은 아닙니다. 저의 생각으로는 주석사는 세기 중의 중요한 결정을 가지고 있 습니다. 아마도 그 중의 가장 중요한 것 중 하나는 이들이 찾아야 한다 당시의 역사적인 맥락이 그 영향을 대부분 걸어내고 있다는 것입니다. 이미 앞에서 말했지만 봉나바다의 가르침은 중요한 부분들이 브리하바다아야, 우바라바바사와 같은 초기 봉나바다 초창기 문헌들과 상대하면서 봉나 바와 동의하거나 반대로 형성되었던 것으로 보여집니다. 따라서 우리가 이러한 맥락이나 논점을 얻지 못한다면, 봉나바다가 이런 없이 해는 광범위한 부분들을 지나쳐버릴 수 있습니다.

두 번째 결론은 봉나바다 자신이 예언하고 경고 했던 주석사들의 지나친 적격주의적인 경영입니다. 이러한 경우들을 발견하기 위해서는 황백 사의 연구와 같은 것이 필요합니다. 따라서 이것은 단지 문제를 발견 하여 비유를 분석하는 것만이 아닐 것입니다. 만일 봉나바다 이런 사용하 기로 되어 이기주의하는 사람의 용어와 논점을 차용하여 변형시키고 전 해 다른 의미를 이들에게 전달하고 한다면, 우리는 아리나를 다루고

6) Early History of Buddhism in Ceylon, Colombo 1946.
있는 것으로 보다의 표현을 떠밀 그의 목소리의 음색을 알아차려야 하는 것입니다.

이 점에 대해서는 여기서 몇주로 잠시 미루어 сочета겠습니다. 현재까지 현대학자들과 보다의 해석들은 보다와 브랸다 전통과의 관계를 지나치게 단순화하는 경향이 있습니다. 벌리 전통은 따르는 한 전체에 따르고 보다는 단순히 브랸다들에게 반대하는 것으로 나타납니다. 하지만 벌리 전통과 보다 사이의 유사점들에 주목한다면 그 사이에 반대하는 중요한 차이점을 제시하면 보다는 고대적으로 패턴을 따르는 것으로 즉시 알만 것입니다. 하지만 진실은 흔히 더 미ろ하고 흥미롭습니다. 보다는 단순히 ' 벌리' 묻리라고 이야기하기 보다는 '맞는 거지'라고, 즉으로 이야기합니

d. 여기에서 '하지만'은 아주 조용해서도 아주 강력한 반대입니다.

주석들의 세 번째 결점을 오늘의 주제와 관련이 적지는 하지만 연 급해야만 할 만큼 중요한 것으로 동일화됩니다. 거의 모든 종교 전통에서 나타나는데 주석들은 교주의 가르침을 동일화하면서 세세하게 합니다. 브랸 주석전통에 의하면 수르타는 오직 한가지의 의도만을 가진 다는 명백한 원리를 가지고 있는데 이를 ekā-niyat라고 합니다. 불교에서는 이러한 원리가 형성되지 않았고, 고대 인도에서 이루어진 불교의 문화가 주도권을 지고 다른 모든 종교들에 없는 영향을 끼쳤다는 것을 알아야 할 것입니다.

이상의 결점들에 대한 인식을 통해 비록 오늘 이야기 하기에 너무 많지만 폰타가 전달하던 것에 대한 새로운 중요한 인목을 제공해 줄니다. 다른 전통에서의 보다는 전달하던 가르침의 핵심이 자비와 지혜라는 두 가지 가치가 있다고 함으로 간략히 이 두가지에 관련된 발전들에 대해 이야기 하겠습니다.

먼저, 자비는 자혜의 실천은 하나의 수단으로서 일반을 얻는 방법이라는 것을 찾다가 가르쳤다는 것을 우리는 알 수 있게 되었습니다. 벌리 전통은 자비에 대해 담당자가 강조하고 있는데 가장 많이 알려져 있고 사용되고 있는 계승은 벌리 전통의 대표적인 가르침이 됩니다. 오늘날 스파리카라고 모든 학생들이 학교에서 집중으로 들어가기 전에 암송하면서 어떤 의미있을 생각하게 하는 것입니다. 이 교지는 대부분은 어떻게 하면 자기 자신이나 자신의 자비를 사랑하는 것과 같이 모든 생명들을 사랑할 수 있는지를 묘사하고 있습니다. 이 계승은 다음과 같은 결론을 갖습니다. 이 세상의 모든 것에 대해서 우리는 위 아래 앞으로 장애가 없고 한정, 증오, 경찰이 없는 사랑하는 마음들을 길러야 한다. 사 일을 때나 애나 때나 누를 때나 우리는 마음이 여기를 향하도록 하는 것에 게어려서는 안 될 것이다. 이것은 이 세계에서의 선명한 삶으로 부른다. 사상이나 도덕을 완벽한 직관과 함께 버리지 말고 감각적인 기쁨에 대한 욕심을 통제하면 더 이상 어머니의 모태로 돌아가지 않아도 된다. 이 계승을 자바로 통해 일반에 접근할 수 있음을 이야기하고 있는 것이 다. 이러한 이야기는 이 문헌에만 국한되어 있는 것은 아니다. 벌리가 직접 낙생한 것으로 유명한 벌리 계승들의 모임인 담마파의 유명한 368년 계승은 다음과 같아 이야기하고 있습니다. 자비에 미루고 벌리의 가르

의 사원을 지칭하는 말로서 인도의 비하직주관 용어의 기원이기도 합니다. 미루는 장소로 의미로부터 사원을 의미하게 됩니다. 시간을 보내다, 머무르다를 의미하는 동사에서 파생된 명사로 간단하게 미루음에 의미합니다. '브라호마'란 무엇인가? 브라마인란 브라만 사전의 종교적 인 목록에 주어진 이름으로 브라만의 지혜를 전달하는 문헌인 우파니사드에서 일정한 의무로서 쓰이는 말입니다. 브라만적 의무로서 '브라호마'는 종교적인, 남성으로서 최고의 신으로서 중앙적원의 인격화 로 볼 수 있는 브라만(Brahman)을 한말 의미합니다. 문헌 역사적으로 보았을 때 그 반대가 될 수도 있지만 이 경우 브라만으로 표기합니다. 불교 용어로서 '브라호마 비하라'는 따라서 미루어 보지 않는 브라만 전체를 보는 뜻으로 보아주는데, 기본적으로 브라만과 함께 머무르기를 의미하기 때문입니다. 여기에서 '브라호마'는 인격적으로 보편적인 인격으로 보는 브라만 전체에 대한 것으로 보리는 것은 극단적인 용례로서 구원의 상태를 의미합니다.

표시가 '브라호마 비하라가 몇몇 단계에서 나타나는데 가장 빠르게 인용되는 설명은 제비자심사에서 나옵니다. 사실상, 메타심사의 몇몇 용 어와 주제는 메타심사에서 나온 것입니다. 이 단계의 경계에서 브라만은 대가자 '브라호마 비하러'가 서술적인 맥락에서 브라만과 함께 인식되는 직관적인 방법을 놓고 논쟁하던 두 점은 브라만 사전이 불교 에게 질문하기로 합니다. 이것은 간 대로 이어지는데 브라만의 경우도 적절한 목표로 가는 길을 브라만 사전이 가르치고 있다며 비판합니다. 그는 다른 것들 중에서 이것을 어떻게 생각했는지 누구인지도 어디 에서든지 거의 끝지 못하면서 아담을 비롯한 머리에 사용자로 세우는데 의존하고 비판합니다. 그의 제가 바다로는 상호적 묘함을 다 한다고 주장하는 브라만 사전들은 그들이 가진 '브라호마(Brahma)'의 모습과 비교합니다. 그들은 '브라호마와 달랐기 때문에 브라호마'와 함께 할 것이라고 주장하는 브라만의 경계가 바로 브라호마와 달랐다고 합니다. 불교의 승려는 생활방식에 대한 이야기는 승려는 모든 반면에 전통, 자비, 공감하는 기술 그리고 평화로 중만해진다는 이야기에서 정점에 이릅니다. 따라서 불교에 의하든 이러한 승려는 죽어서 브라호마와 함께 지내게 되다고 말할 수 있게 되는 것입니다.

여기에 예외되지 두 점은 브라만 사전들은 불교로 개선하게 됩니다.

8) 그러나 메타심사에서 동일한 'aruna'가 나타나는데 아마도 문제의 심각성 때문일 것인가?
세계로부터 평정까지의 넷 무덤에서 묻는 이들이 성취되면서 유한한 행위가 더 이상 남지 않게 되어서 유한한 결과가 사라지게 된다. 응해로부터의 해탈반 이 여기에 해당한다고 할 수 있을 것 입니다.

직관은 한계가 있는 것이 아닙니다. 브라마과 사바나리아의 이 두 나무에서 나타난 결과 역시 한계가 있습니다. 직관을 끌다는 친절 차비와 같은 각 각의 도덕적 상태와 바꾸는 것이 되는 것 입니다.

불행하게도 티타바라 전통은 여기에서 끌다는 두 점은 브라
만 사제들처럼 직언주의적 마음을 가지고 있는 것 같습니다. 경전은 직
의주의적으로 해석하여 이들한 경계가 없는 경지를 수행하는 사람은 즉
어서 브라호만의 세계로 간다는 의미로 받아들인다는 것은 입니다. 이를
우주관으로 형성되면서 엄청난 결과를 낼게 됩니다. 우주의나 사드나 카미
베다적으로 전통과 같이 끌다는 두 점은 우리가 하고 있는 이 세계에
있는 신들이 살고 있는 척주 또는 몇 중의 척주들이 있다고 생각합니다.
저의 생각으로는 이 페비자수파 때문에 이 위에 최상의 세계를 불릴 수
없는 브라호만 또는 브라호만들의 척주가 대체일 것 같습니다. 복음의
우주관에서 보통의 척주와 브라호만의 척주 사이의 구별은 명확합니다. 이
외의 몇몇 전통에서 전자는 두만하기 세계에 속하는 반면 후자는 형상
의 세계에 속합니다. 누리는 이 세 세계주의적 해석이 라마아리의 구원의 논리와 빛
개념에 제생학의 끌다는 대기설번에 이의하지 못하는 경험을 가졌다는 것
을 알게 되었습니다. 저의 이야기가 맞을 가능성이 더 많을 것 같은 경
정적인 논리의 이와 동기 끌다는 대기한 해탈을 도입하면서 각각에
의 해탈(ceto-vimutti)으로 이야기한다는 정립니다.

그렇다면 이 사제들이 이 중요한 차이를 발견하지 못했거나 반박하지
있았을까요? 끌다는 거짓들이 경계해 되면서 일반은 명확하게 정의
되어야만 했고 일반적인 정의는 탐욕, 현오, 우두함의 완전한 소멸이었습
니다. 여기에 충실한 사제들은 탐욕, 현오, 우두함의 소멸에 대한 이야기
가 없는 현실에 대한 설명을 받아들여서 하지 않았을 것이고 도대체 두
순을 하는가하고 불같을 것입니다. 체계화된 불교 교리에 따르면 끌다는
에 의해 설명된 해탈의 마지막 단계는 현상한 세계의 분할을 무상하여
완전히 못하고 주체를 결여한 것으로 보는 특별한 내용의 직관으로 구
성되어 있습니다. 이 전에 따르면, 도덕, 천지의 단계를 가하며 각각의
요소들이 다음에 필요한 것으로 나타나고 있습니다. 냉 가지 부
한 상황들은 천지의 형태로 분류되며 지혜의 형태로 분류되지 않습니
다. 따라서 직관을 이어나가는 것과 상관이 없습니다.

저는 끌다는 자신이 이 냉 가지 부한 상황들을 도덕이나 지혜에 대비
되는 전후에 분류했을 것으로 보지 않습니다. 냉 가지 모두에 속하
는 것으로 이어가지 못하는 것인가요? 아마도 여전히 직언주의적인 정립
이 이 점을 놓쳤을 때일 것입니다.

이상이 올바르고 실제로선 구체적으로 행한 접근법에 의해 나온 결과인
다. 물론 누구든지 동일한 방법을 사용할 수 있습니다. 저의 생각으로 가
장 높은한 발전은 바라사바 들의 유명한 대사 전문가이기로 한 끌다는
에 의해 만들어졌습니다. 1988년 저는 그녀가 지혜의 인연의 연
쇄인 여자가 벤다의 문화에서 어떻게 묻어진 것을 알 수 있는지를 끌었습니다.
그러나 이 신비한 가르침이 브라만 사상의 근본적인 존재론을 형성하는 해탈의 우주관에 대한 끌다는 응답이라는 한 눈에만이 만들어
졌습니다.

갈락하게 이 냉한 발전에 대해 이야기하겠습니다. 연기는 보편과 특
수라는 두 가지 측면에 이의하지 않고 있습니다. 일반적인 측면에서 이것은
현안이 아름다운 것이라고 말할 수 있고 사실상 다른 것들처럼 완전히 고립된 것

Bhadrakāyā Uparājaa Tevijja Sutta 출처 자세한 비교에 대해서: How
Buddhism Began: The Conditioned Genesis of the Early Teachings,
10) Jurewicz, J. Playing with fire: the pratypsasamutpada from the
perspective of Vedic thought. Jour noal of the Pali Text Society,
XXVI, 2000, pp.77-103. This paper was first read at the conference of the International Association of Buddhist Studies in Lausanne, 1999.
...
대기설법을 대표하는 아주 강력한 예가 될 수 있을 것입니다.

시작한 곳으로 돌아가 결론을 내리겠습니다. 지난 2천 500여 년 동안 불교는 평화적으로 수많은 사람들에 전파되었고 많은 문화를 만들어 냈습니다. 학파들은 그 동안 더욱 풍부해지고 다양해 쌓입니다. 오늘날의 혁신적인 동물물명의 발달은 불교도들에게, 다른 모두에게도 마찬가지로, 적이 보지 못했던 상황을 만들었습니다. 우리는 거의 순간적으로 책, 전화, 이메일을 통해 의사교환을 할 수 있고 한국에서 학생들이 온스피드로 오고 저가 이렇게 한국으로 왔습니다. 그렇다면 불교의 연구도 이러한 것들을 잘 활용하고 있음을가? 저는 그렇지 않다고 봅니다. 온스피드 불교학 센터는 한국과 같은 전통적인 불교 국가와 영국과 같이 불교가 아직 많이 알려지지 않은 나라들 사이의 세계적인 협력을 모색합니다. 모든 형태의 불교를 연구하고 어떤 방법론이든 결과가 나온다면 적용하려 합니다. 이 강의에서 이야기 했듯이 아직까지 자비와 지혜라는 불교의 핵심적인 가르침을 포만하는 많은 사람들이 아직되지 않고 남아 있습니다. 제정신한 수단이 해결될 수만 있다면, 우리는 불교와 같은 단체를 구성해서 이 세계가 목 필요로 하고 있는 자비와 지혜를 이 세계에 널리 알리고 실은 마음입니다.

Organicism Ethics

-An Indian Spiritual Perspective-

S. R. Bhatt

One of the most significant implications of the Organicism view of Reality is the acceptance that the cosmos, rather the cosmic process, is a totality of occurrences and not of things. It is a highly complex and intricate but planned and purposive networking of events and not a mechanistic arrangement of preexistent entities. Every existence, living or non-living has a dependent origination out of a casual complex characterized by mutuality and openness, inter-relatedness and reciprocity. Each one has a specific nature, place, role and function in the cosmic setup as determined in the scheme of the universe. The cosmos is a vast and subtle inter-netting of multiple interrelated and interdependent existences which are in a constant flux. It has physical, mental and spiritual dimensions. There is determinism at the physical level but freedom and spontaneity at the spiritual level. The mental realm is partly determined and partly free. The human being is a organic unity of psycho-physical process animated by spiritual element. It is thus a complex of body, mind and spirit.

With these metaphysical premises one can work out

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